Hierarchical models (HMs; Lindley & Smith, 1972) o er considerable promise to increase the level of realism in social science modeling, but the scope of what is validly concludable with them is limited, and recent technical advances in allied elds may not yet have been put to best use in implementing them. In this paper I (1) examine three levels of inferential strength supported by typical social science data-gathering methods, and call for a greater degree of explicitness, when HMs and other models are applied, in identifying which level is appropriate; (2) reconsider the use of HMs in school effectiveness studies and meta-analysis from the perspective of causal inference; and (3) recommend the increased use of Gibbs sampling and other Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in the application of HMs in the social sciences, so that comparisons between MCMC and better-established tting methods|including full or restricted maximum likelihood estimation based on the EM algorithm, Fisher scoring or iterative generalized least squares|may be more fully informed by empirical practice.
Introduction
Much of the data gathered in the social sciences to answer scienti c and decisionmaking questions has a nested or hierarchical character. Examples in elds as disparate as economics, education, and health policy come immediately to mind:
The multistage cluster sampling employed by the U.S. government's main instrument for estimating local and national unemployment rates, the Current Population Survey (e.g., Bureau of the Census, 1978) , in which random samples are taken at each of the state, area, and (city) block levels; The natural grouping of information relevant to the study of educational e ectiveness (e.g., Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) into variables gathered at the student, class, school, and district levels; and The measurement of quality of hospital care (e.g., Rogers et al., 1990; Draper et al., 1990) obtained from samples of patients chosen from each of a number of sampled hospitals, themselves perhaps drawn from a sample of geographic areas. For decades quantitative workers in the social sciences have taken advantage of the hierarchical character of such data at the design stage of their investigations (e.g., Deming, 1947) , using the multilevel organization of the population of interest to guide the datagathering. One might have expected that anything playing such a central role in the design must also have been accurately represented in the analysis, but surprisingly until about ten years ago hierarchical analyses that made e ective use of the nested data structure were the exception rather than the rule in much social science research, and there are egregious examples of underestimated uncertainty assessments arising from a failure to account for the homogeneity within levels of the hierarchy exhibited by cluster samples (see, e.g., Kish, 1957 , for a summary of this problem). Why did day-to-day empirical work lag behind the perception of correct practice for so long?
The reason was mainly the constraints of technique. Although standard analysis of variance methods dating back to the 1920s (e.g., Fisher, 1925; see Sche e, 1956 , for some of the history) have long provided partial answers to some of the questions posed by some kinds of data gathered in a fully nested manner, the general formulation of the hierarchical linear model (HM) was not given until the early 1970s (Lindley & Smith, 1972) , and the tting of such models in something approaching full generality proved elusive until the introduction of the EM algorithm (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977) later in that decade. Since then a variety of alternative tting methods have been developed|including full or restricted maximum likelihood based on Fisher scoring (Longford, 1987) or iterative generalized least squares (Goldstein, 1986) , and Gibbs sampling and other Markov-chain Monte Carlo methods (e.g., Smith & Roberts, 1993) , although this last approach has not yet caught on fully in multilevel modeling in some of the social sciences, including education| and the number of applications of HMs is burgeoning.
1.1 Multilevel Data Analysis Before HMs Historically popular methods for analyzing multilevel data that preceded hierarchical models include what de Leeuw (1992) calls disaggregation and aggregation techniques. In the former, for instance in a study of student performance with a four-level nesting structure (schools, teachers, classes, and individuals), one might attempt an OLS regression in which \teacher, class, and school characteristics are all assigned to the individual, and the analysis is done on the individual level." This is unsatisfactory because the implied covariance matrix of the performance outcome fails to capture the within-school, within-teacher, and within-class homogeneity one would expect the data to exhibit through positive intracluster (intraclass) correlations. In the latter|for instance, with the means on means or ecological regression approach (see, e.g., the discussion of Aitkin & Longford, 1986 )|one attempts to avoid this problem by aggregating across units at the lower levels of the hierarchy and then building linear models for the aggregates. But this runs afoul of the aggregation bias problem, long familiar to econometricians (e.g., Judge et al., 1988) and other quantitative workers, in which aggregate relationships typically appear stronger than they would at the individual level, where predictions of the greatest relevance to policy must be made.
1.2 Advantages of HMs Hierarchical models o er at least three clear advantages, both conceptual and technical, over these and other methods for the analysis of multilevel data in the social sciences.
As noted by many authors (e.g., Goldstein, 1987; Burstein et al., 1989) , HMs provide a natural environment within which to express and compare theories about structural relationships among variables at each of the levels in the organizational or sampling hierarchy;
In sharp contrast with standard regression methods applied to observations made with cluster sampling, the tting of HMs yields better-calibrated uncertainty assessments in the presence of positive intracluster correlations of a magnitude typical in social science data (e.g., Scott & Holt, 1982; Longford, 1994) ; and HMs o er an explicit framework in which to express similarity (exchangeability) judgments (e.g., Draper et al., 1993a) , in order to combine information across units (such as students or schools) to produce accurate and well-calibrated predictions of observable outcomes. However, as with any other methodological advance, there are limits to what may be validly concluded on the basis of a hierarchical analysis|examples that overstep this boundary have already begun to appear|and there is always room for potential technical improvements. In this paper (1) I focus on issues of interpretation of multilevel analyses in education, arguing that the level of explicitness in the scope of inferential conclusions drawn from HMs needs to be raised; (2) I examine the causal implications of the use of HMs in school e ectiveness studies and meta-analysis; and (3) I conclude with some remarks on the value of comparative study of the various tting methods in current or potential use in hierarchical modeling, with an emphasis on contrasting the methods that are currently most popular with Gibbs sampling and other MCMC methods.
Interpreting Hierarchical Analyses
As an example of where I'm headed in this section, consider the HM analysis presented by Huttenlocher et al. (1991) on the e ects of parental speech on early childhood vocabulary growth. The data for this analysis were gathered in the following way.
\Parents who were full-time caregivers were recruited through newspaper ads from a relatively educated middle-class, urban community. For all children studied], this caregiver was the mother. There were two groups of parent-child pairs. Each group contained 11 children (6 boys and 5 girls). The groups varied somewhat in the conditions in which subjects were observed. Subjects in Group 1 were seen every 2nd month for 5 hr. Five children were 14 months old] at the beginning of the study, and 6 children were 16 months; all children were 26 months at its conclusion. Subjects in Group 2 were seen every 4th month for 3 hr., beginning when children were 16 months and continuing until they were 24 months. ... Children and their mothers were observed during children's typical daily activities. ... The written transcript, including all utterances produced by the child and directed at the child, was completed later from an audio or video] tape recording."
In their modeling work the authors chose to de ne the exposure of the children to speech from their mothers by measuring the total number of words the mothers directed to their children in the 3-hour observation period at 16 months. One may visualize the data gathered in this way as a rectangular array with 22 rows and 10 columns: Y ti , the vocabulary size for child i at t months (t = 14; 16; : : :; 26, with missing values at four of these timepoints for Group 2); X i , the exposure for child i; and dummy variables for group membership and gender. Preliminary data analysis indicated that the relationship between Y ti and t was roughly quadratic, with near-zero coe cients for the constant and linear terms when time was measured forward from one year of age, and that it was useful to work with the exposure variable on the log scale.
Among other models the authors t the growth-curve HM Y ti = 2i (t ? 12) 2 + ti (within-subjects), 2i = 0 + 1 group i + 2 log(X i ) + 3 gender i + U i (between-subjects).
(1)
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Here \ 2i represents the acceleration in vocabulary growth for child i," ti is the \deviation of child i from his/her growth trajectory at time t," U i \represents a unique e ect for child i on the acceleration parameter," and the ti and U i are regarded as Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and variances 2 and , respectively. The authors report a variety of standard errors (SEs) and p values computed on the basis of this model|for instance, the estimated coe cient^ 2 for log(exposure) in the between-subjects level of model (1) comes out 0.89** with an SE of 0.36 (**p < :05)|and speak in a rather general way about the lessons learned from these inferential results, e.g., \In summary, our data strongly suggest that the number of word learning trials to which a child is exposed is an important factor in the acquisition of vocabulary items."
But what meaning, if any, may be attached to such p values|and to the SEs the authors quote for the parameter estimates arising from the tting of model (1) above|and what is the valid scope of inferences drawn from this model with these data?
The Predictive Approach to Inference, and its Interpretive Advantages. In answering this question it is useful to consider the perspective provided by the approach to inference, based on the prediction of observable quantities, advocated by de Finetti (e.g., 1974/75) and developed by Lindley (e.g., 1972 ), Geisser (e.g., 1993) (1) above, may come up in this story as place-holders for particular kinds of uncertainty on the way to prediction of observables, but in many cases (see, e.g., Lane, 1986) they have no objective reality of their own, and do not receive anywhere near as much emphasis as they get in other inferential approaches. By focusing on things that you can see rather than things you can't, this outlook has the advantage of readily available calibration information on the quality of your inferences: in educational research you can make predictions, with uncertainty assessments, for a number of students and schools, and compare their actual outcomes with what you thought they would be. If you miss by a lot more than you thought you would in a lot of these predictions, you are out of calibration, and need to revise your uncertainty assessments. This may be contrasted with (say) con dence statements about unobservable parameters|how do you know when they're right?
In practice in the social sciences the data you have and the data you wish you had may di er from each other in three main ways:
Problems of measurement error arise when you are trying to quantify something elusive, such as intelligence, and you are not sure if you got it right. The data you have then consist of one or more scales (say) that you hope measure the \underlying construct" of interest, and the data you wish you had are the actual values of that construct, if only you knew how to measure it well. In this case X can fall short of Y in at least two ways, identi ed by the concepts of reliability (X is an unbiased but possibly noisy estimate of Y ) and validity (X may be biased for Y ). This is an important topic, both rather generally in social science research (see, e.g., Freedman, 1983 , for a sharp critique of such research based largely on this issue) and in particular in education, where Burstein (e.g., 1980 ) and others have expressed concern at the application of complex analytic methods to problems relying on measures of key constructs (such as the di culty level of the material taught, in studies of student performance) of unclear validity. Problems of a counterfactual nature arise with experimental data when you are trying to quantify the e ects of a particular cause, such as a new teaching method, and the outcome for each student in the experiment may be observed for only one setting of the supposedly causal factor, new versus standard method (say). Here the data you have for the treatment (control) students is the outcome they exhibited under the new (standard) method, and the data you wish you had is the outcome the same students would have exhibited if instead they had been taught with the standard (new) method. This model dates back at least to Neyman (1923/90) and|in the special, and almost certainly false, case in which the two outcomes for each person are identical (though di ering from person to person), to Fisher (1935) |and has been extensively developed over the last 15 years or so by Rubin (1978) , Holland (1986) , and others. It provides a good example of the value of de Finetti's approach in clarifying what people mean when they talk about causal inference (see, e.g., Sobel, 1994) and what must be assumed to support such inference. Problems of a sampling nature (e.g., Cochran, 1978) arise when there is a nite population of subjects of direct scienti c or policy interest (such as all sixth-grade students enrolled in California public schools in fall 1993, or all eighth-grade math teachers in New York as of 1 March 1994) and, typically for reasons of cost, you are able to obtain data only on a subset of the population. In this case the data you have is the information on the sampled individuals and the data you wish you had is the corresponding information on the unsampled people. All three of these ways in which X and Y di er may in turn be thought of as special cases of the general missing data problem, addressable|at least in principle|by imputation methods (e.g., Rubin, 1987; Little and Rubin, 1987) . See Little and Schenker (1994) for a recent review of this approach.
A Taxonomy of Inferential Strength in Statistical Modeling
When inferential examples, in the social sciences in general and education research in particular, are examined from the predictive point of view, four kinds of inference|of varying strength and scope of generalizability|are discernible, which may be termed calibration inference, speci c and general causal inference, and sampling inference, respectively. In the remainder of this section I examine the implications of this taxonomy for hierarchical modeling, although the discussion applies rather generally to the use of stochastic models in the social sciences.
3.1 Calibration Inference The lowest level of inferential strength and generalizability of results arises when attempts are made to model data that are neither experimental in character nor sampled, from the population P of most direct scienti c or decision-making relevance to the question at hand, in a way that supports straightforward exchangeability assumptions about how the sampled and unsampled units are likely to be similar and how they are likely to di er. Freedman et al. (1991) call such data samples of convenience; a slightly less pejorative name for them might be uncertain exchangeability (UE) samples. The Huttenlocher et al. example above would seem to fall into this category:
From various conclusions of unquali ed scope drawn in the paper (e.g., \The present study provides the rst direct evidence that amount of exposure is important to vocabulary growth"), the authors appear to have quite a broad population in mind, and yet the data consist of 22 mother-child pairs from families living in a single \relatively educated middle-class urban community" (which I will refer to here as Chicago for discussion purposes) who responded to newspaper ads; and Several statements headed in the direction of causal inference are made, e.g., \To evaluate the substantive signi cance of the relation between exposure and acceleration (^ 2 = :89), we note that the raw frequency of mothers' speech in our sample ranges from approximately 700 to 7000 words, ... a di erence of 2.30 units in the log metric. Controlling for di erences in gender and group, 2i is expected to be 2:30 0:89 = 2:09 units larger for a child whose mother speaks 7000 words than a mother who speaks only 700 words. ... This translates into a di erence in child vocabulary of 2:05 (16 ? 12) 2 = 33 words at 16 months, 131 words at 20 months, and 295 words at 24 months."
However the data are purely observational in character, and little or no information on potential confounding factors (hereafter PCFs)|such as the amount of nonverbal communication between the children and mothers|is available to permit any adjustment for the e ects of these variables. Some (e.g., Freedman et al., 1991) would say that no inferential conclusions are possible with convenience (UE) samples|and from the predictive viewpoint it does seem di cult to identify the as-yet-unobserved data values to which Huttenlocher et al.'s analysis refers| but there is a limited form of inference that I nevertheless nd both justi able and somewhat useful in this case. The point has been made (see, e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Diaconis, 1985) that people are quite good at identifying interesting patterns in data|so good, in fact, that they are capable of nding them even when they're not really there to be found, in the sense that the apparent pattern would fail to materialize in attempts to validate the results of the data-gathering activity by repeating it. It is arguable that we need some form of calibration inference to restrain our enthusiasm in the search for scienti c relationships. Indeed this was the original motivation for signi cance tests, and| given that estimates of quantities of direct scienti c or policy relevance, together with uncertainty assessments for those estimates, are typically much more meaningful than p values|it is essentially the only worthwhile use of such tests (see, e.g., Oakes, 1990 , for a thorough account of the misuse of signi cance tests in the social sciences).
Two forms of calibration inference in routine use are procedures based on hypothetical sampling models and permutation tests, both due to Fisher (1925 Fisher ( , 1935 .
In hypothetical sampling inference \the data] values (or sets of values) before us are interpreted as a random sample from] a hypothetical in nite population of such values as may have arisen in the same circumstances. The distribution of this population will be capable of some kind of mathematical speci cation, involving a certain number, usually few, of parameters" (Fisher, 1925) . You then proceed to work out a sampling distribution for estimates of those parameters, in e ect by calculating all possible values the parameter estimates could take on across hypothetical replications of the sampling experiment that produced your data; the standard deviation of this distribution is the SE Fisher would have you quote as a measure of your uncertainty about the values of the hypothetical population parameters, and this SE becomes the denominator in z-ratios that lead to p values for tests of null hypotheses about those parameters. The trouble with this formulation applied to UE samples is that the hypothetical population corresponding to the observed sample and the population P of real interest will often not be the same. Survey sampling specialists (e.g., Cochran, 1978) call the former the sampled population and the latter the target population, and emphasize that di erences between them lead to invalid inferences about the target population. I do not nd standard errors computed from UE samples meaningful, and I do not see that the parameters in a model such as (1) above have any meaning when such models are applied to UE samples, except as technical intermediaries that aid in prediction of future observables (e.g., vocabulary sizes at ages beyond those observed for the children in Huttenlocher et al.'s data set), an activity those authors do not emphasize. The point is that Huttenlocher et al. did not write their article as if they were interested only in what would happen if you repeatedly ran newspaper ads in Chicago and recruited 22 mother-child pairs each time, but|without an argument supporting exchangeability of the people in their study with other people, as yet unnamed|that is the only population to which their parameter estimates and SEs are of direct inferential relevance. In permutation inference, which arises most naturally when comparing two groups on a single outcome, you condition on the observed data and consider all possible ways in which the observations might be rearranged among the two groups, computing a summary such as the di erence in group means for each possible permutation; a p value may then be calculated by asking how often di erences as large as the one observed or larger would occur. When he introduced this procedure Fisher (1935) had in mind experimental situations involving random assignment to the two groups, but (e.g., Freedman & Lane, 1983 ) the calculation may be performed no matter how the data in the groups were obtained, and even when no causal or sampling inference is justi able the resulting p value does seem to have some calibrative value: the idea is that life is short, there's not enough time to investigate all the interesting-looking relationships, perhaps we should focus on the ones that seem likely to show up again if we went out and got more data. With moderate to large samples, p values based on comparisons of means will tend to be similar with the permutation and hypothetical sampling approaches, essentially by virtue of the Central Limit Theorem (e.g., Welch, 1937) , so that a somewhat roundabout justi cation of the normal-theory p values calculated by Huttenlocher et al. may be attempted: there is probably some sort of calibration-style permutation test that their normal-theory tests are trying to approximate. In the absence of better sampling or causal motivation for their data, however, I nd no scienti c meaning in the parameter estimates and SEs Huttenlocher et al. report, and the strongest interpretation I am able to make of their p values is calibrative. It is clear that we have learned something about child development for people outside Chicago, but (see, e.g., Holland, 1989) without judgmentally estimating what might be called a variance component for non-exchangeability between sampled and unsampled units in this broader population, and a variance component for the e ects of unmeasured PCFs| quantities that are unaddressed by Huttenlocher et al.'s data|it is di cult to quantify just what has been learned more broadly, either causally or external to the 22 mother-child pairs in their study.
For other recent examples of what appear to be inferential hierarchical analyses of UE samples, see, e.g., Bryk & Frank (1991) , Bryk & Raudenbush (1987; 1989, sections 4.2 and 5.1; 1992, chapters 4, 5, and 8), Fitz-Gibbon (1991) , Goldstein (1987, sections 2.3 and 4.4; , and Raudenbush & Bryk (1989, section 5.3) . It is possible that stronger conclusions are supported by some of these studies, but so little space is devoted in them to the origins of the data analyzed and the valid scope of their ndings that it is hard to tell. Some of the papers and books mentioned in this section are methodological in character, and in such work people sometimes sidestep the question of what kind of inference they're making by calling the modeling \illustrative," but (e.g., Draper, 1987) if you use UE samples in your examples and draw what look like substantive conclusions, you risk misleading your audience about the scope of the \illustrative" ndings, and in any case an unfortunate precedent is set for the substantive papers that will later apply the methodology.
Few discussions of the relationship between the sampled and target populations are to be found in the recent use of HMs in education research; an exception is Longford (1991a) , who gives a critique of the di culties encountered in trying to make the two populations coincide in pretest studies.
3.2 Causal Inference A higher level in the ladder of inferential strength arises when investigators interested in the e ects of particular causes|such as a novel teaching method or a new way to allocate educational funding|gather data on some subjects, using either a controlled experiment or a well-conducted observational study design, and build a causal inference model. An example is provided by the Cognitive Strategies in Writing Project (Englert et al., 1988) , examined by Bryk & Raudenbush (1992, hereafter BR) . This study (the quote is from BR) \sought to improve childrens' writing and to enhance their self-perceptions of academic competence through a variety of strategies. The outcome variable was a measure of perceived academic self-competence (mean 2.92, SD 0.58) for which a pretest, denoted X ij , served as the covariate. The study involved 256 children in 22 classrooms in a standard two-group design, with 15 experimental and 7 control classrooms. Because teachers administered the treatments to intact classrooms, we have, in classical terms, a nested or hierarchical design: students are nested within classrooms and classrooms are nested within two treatment groups."
To these data BR t the HM Y ij = 0j + 1j (X ij ? X :: ) + r ij (level 1), 0j = 00 + 01 W j + u 0j ; 1j = 10 (level 2),
in which Y ij is the self-perceived competence of child i in classroom j at the end of the experiment; W j is a classroom-level dummy variable for experimental/control status; X :: is the pretest grand mean, which came out 2.86 here; and the r ij and u 0j are \errors," regarded as Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and variances 2 and 00 , respectively. The estimate of the treatment e ect in this model comes out^ 01 = :19, with an SE of .10 , which is statistically signi cant at the .05 level if you do a one-tailed test (although probably not practically signi cant: the di erence between adjusted experimental and control means is only about 6% of the control mean, and is less than a third of the overall betweenchild SD). Causal conclusions are de nitely in the air here (\... the] experimental children By comparison the SE from an OLS model that does not include random classroom e ects is .074, a value that is misleadingly small because it does not account for the positive intracluster correlation arising from the nesting of students within classes. developed a signi cantly higher perceived self-competence than did the control children"), but causal for whom, and under what implicit assumption(s) not yet articulated?
The counterfactual framework mentioned in the previous subsection is clarifying. Table 1 below gives a visualization of the data from this perspective, with plausible numerical values for the observed outcomes and pretest scores, and question marks for the counterfactual outcomes. Actually there are two counterfactual stories operating here: in addition to wondering about what the experimental (control) students' outcomes would have been if they had been in the control (experimental) group, the presence of the pretest X in model (2) means that BR would also like to know what the observed experimental and control means on the outcome Y would have been if the mean X-values in the two groups had been the same instead of di ering slightly ( X e = 2:90; X c = 2:80). In this case the HM estimates from model (2) ll in the question marks|or at least provide guesses for their averages within the experimental and control groups, if these groups had been the same on average on the pretest|by computing the adjusted means Y e ?^ 01 ( X e ? X :: ) = 2:96 and Y c ?^ 01 ( X c ? X :: ) = 2:78 as in the usual analysis of covariance. The only essential di erence, in fact, from the usual ANCOVA is that the presence of the \random" classroom e ects u 0j in (2) above accounts sensibly for the withinclass homogeneity exhibited by the students on the academic competence outcome (the conditional intracluster correlation for Y given X here is about^ = :08). However, the adjusted means are good estimates of the averages across the question marks in the two groups only if the groups are similar on variables likely to be strongly correlated with Y (after adjusting for X)|that is, if they are similar on PCFs, such as the amount of encouragement the students got at home while the experiment was in progress. Why should this be so?
One reason would be random treatment allocation (or at least randomization would tend to promote balance on the PCFs), but BR fail to mention whether the experimental and control classrooms were assigned at random. In the absence of random assignment, the use of^ 01 as an estimate, for the children in Table 1 , of the e ect on self-perceived academic competence caused by the intervention rests on an implicit assumption of what Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) call strong ignorability of the treatment allocation mechanism conditional on the pretest X: the assumption (for the students in the table) that Y and experimental status are independent given X. If you don't believe this assumption|e.g., if you have a PCF, not yet in model (2), in mind that is likely to be in uential after X is accounted for|then there is no reason for you to regard the issue of the e ect caused by the intervention for the students in Table 1 as settled. Model (2) has correctly in ated the SE of^ 01 , to account for within-classroom homogeneity, in relation to the value it would have had assuming independence of all 256 student outcomes, but it has neither modi ed 01 nor its SE to account for uncertainties in the validity of causal inferences based on the raw group means adjusted only for X.
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Speci c Versus General Causal Inference. Moreover, even if either treatment assignment were random in this experiment or you were willing to assume strong ignorability given the pretest, the topic of scope of inferences based on^ 01 remains to be addressed: Under random assignment or strong ignorability, model (2) shows that something causal is going on for the 256 students in Table 1 (although the e ect is not very big) , but what about other students? From a policy point of view, it is nice to know that there exists a group of students for whom the Cognitive Strategies in Writing Project intervention makes a modest di erence, but without some e ort to relate these 256 children to the broader collection of other students to whom the intervention might be o ered, it is not clear how much has been learned about whether the program should be tried elsewhere.
The distinction between what might be termed speci c causal inference (there's something causal going on for the people in this experiment) and general causal inference (there's something causal going on for everybody in the target population) is particularly forceful in medical research, where|to judge from articles in leading journals over the past ten years|it is nevertheless routinely ignored. A typical recent example is a study by Ahmed, Garrigo, & Danta (1993) , in which 12 patients who presented at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach with exercise-induced asthma during the last half of 1992 (and who in addition were selected on the basis of a number of intake criteria) were randomized into three groups of size four, one group receiving heparin, another cromolyn sodium, the third a placebo. A statistically signi cant di erence between the groups was found, in favor of heparin, and both the abstract (\Inhaled heparin prevents exercise-induced asthma without in uencing histamine-induced bronchoconstriction") and the discussion section of the paper read as if there is no longer any uncertainty about how everybody with this ailment should be treated.
This pitfall clearly also arises in educational research, and the use of HMs|whether the studies giving rise to the data to which the HMs are t are randomized or not| does not avoid it. In particular, making the classroom e ects random rather than xed in model (2) does not convert a UE sample of classrooms into a random sample from the target population of real policy interest. A parallel comment applies to the use of random variables in Huttenlocher et al.'s model (1) above: regarding the \errors" at both levels of model (1) as realizations of random variables does not make the 22 mother-child pairs any more or less \randomly" drawn from the target population than they would have been if you had treated the lack-of-t terms in model (1) in some other way.
For other recent examples of speci c causal inference with HMs in observational studies (\quasi-experiments") involving educational interventions see, e.g., Ra e (1991) and Jacobsen (1991) .
3.3 Sampling Inference The fourth entry in the inferential hierarchy arises when su cient good fortune and money are available to sample representatively from the target population and build a sampling model. There are two cases to distinguish, according to whether or not causal inferences are desired instead of (or in addition to) sampling inferences; in the sampling world the distinction is roughly that between descriptive and analytical surveys (Cochran, 1978) . A recent example involving HMs that had the potential to include both kinds of inference is the study conducted by Lockheed & Longford (1991) , who examined school-and student-level factors associated with successful mathematics achievement in Thailand. The data, from the IEA Second International Mathematics Study, were gathered with a twostage sampling design employing strati cation at the rst stage (the primary sampling units were national education regions) and clustering at the second: the cluster units were schools, chosen randomly to produce a 1% sample of all eighth-grade mathematics classrooms in each region. One class was selected at random per school, and all students enrolled for the entire academic year in the chosen class became part of the sample, resulting in a data set containing 32 variables|13 at the student level, ve pertaining to school characteristics, four to the teacher, nine to the classroom, and one to the region|measured on a total of 4,030 students in 99 schools. The choice of one class from each school confounded the school, teacher, and classroom levels in the design, so that Lockheed & Longford (LL) simply referred to measures at those levels as \group" variables.
Sampling inferences, such as estimation of the average number of students per math class in Thailand (about 44) or the proportion of students in the country with access to a calculator at home (roughly 31%), were not the main emphasis in LL's study, but could have been based on HMs that re ected the sampling design, with xed e ects for the regions and random e ects for the classes and students to accurately estimate the relevant intracluster correlations. In the analytic part of their work, LL t a variety of multilevel models with xed and random coe cients to nd characteristics at the student and group levels that were associated with student achievement in mathematics, noting (for instance) that large school size was positively associated with high achievement, and high levels of teacher time spent on maintaining order in the classroom were negatively associated with math learning. LL concluded with the important point that even though their sample was representative of eighth-grade mathematics education in Thailand, the process by which students were assigned to treatment groups de ned by factors such as school enrollment and teachers' disciplinary styles was observational, so that it would be rash to regard these associations as causal.
\Identifying the variables associated with higher outcome scores in an observational study] does not o er a direct answer to the principal question of a development agency about the distribution of its resources to a set, or continuum, of intervention policies in an educational system. Without any prior knowledge of that system], any justi cation for an intervention policy based only] on the results of regression (or variance component) analysis, or even of structural modeling (LISREL), has no proper foundation."
Additional recent examples of HMs based on what appear to be representative samples from policy-relevant target populations in education include Bryk & Raudenbush (1989, section 3 .2), Lee & Smith (1991) , Paterson (1991) , Raudenbush & Bryk (1989, section 4 .2), and Zuzovsky & Aitkin (1991) . I have been unable to nd any instances of general causal inference|in which a representative sample from the target population is enrolled in a randomized controlled experiment|in the recent education literature on the use of HMs. Table 2 summarizes this section by displaying the four kinds of inference in the taxonomy above in a two-by-two array, with rows de ned by the sampling plan and columns indexing the experimental design. In the language of evaluation research in, say, psychology (e.g., Campbell and Stanley, 1966) 
Random assignment of units to the groups (sampled, unsampled) and (treatment, control) is su cient to land you in the \justi able" row and column in Table 2 , respectively, but not necessary; well-designed nonrandom sampling plans and observational studies can also achieve these distinctions, at least judgmentally, by measuring and appropriately adjusting for all relevant PCFs.
I have considered the taxonomy of inferential strength in this table by way of arguing that an increase in clarity about the scope of valid inferential conclusions supported by complicated analyses, including those based on HMs, would be a net gain, not just in education but quite generally in the social sciences. What I have in mind quite literally would be for people to start explicitly saying in their papers|ideally both in the abstract and body of the article, including the discussion section|which kind of inference they're trying to do. In addition to improved communication of exactly what has been learned in a given study and what remains to be discovered by future studies, this greater explicitness might actually increase the rate at which uncertainty about the population-wide e ects of social policy interventions declines, by promoting a larger funding emphasis on the sorts of experimental and sampling designs that are most e ective in decreasing such uncertainties: controlled experiments and randomized sampling plans, with (1) strati cation on known PCFs at the top of the design; (2) clustering as needed for reasons of cost, and to study the e ects of the interventions at di erent levels of the organizational hierarchy into which the intervention must t; and (3) randomization at the bottom of the design to balance the unknown PCFs.
There is nothing revolutionary about strong designs of this type, and their greater expense over the empirically more prevalent class of observational studies and UE samples is an obstacle to be reckoned with in the social sciences, but other elds in which both data-gathering strategies have been tried|such as medicine (see, e.g., Freedman et al., 1991) |have amply demonstrated that the average number of retrospectively valid causal conclusions per monetary unit is higher with the costlier designs. Ethical considerations sometimes preclude the use of controlled experiments, as with studies of the causal link between smoking and adverse health outcomes in humans, but successes in areas as different as health policy (e.g., Brook et al., 1983) and criminal justice (e.g., Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, 1963) have shown that the eld for social experimentation is wide, and in any case there is nothing unethical about conducting a fully representative sampling study. An increased degree of candidness about the inferential limitations of observational studies and UE samples could shift the funding balance in the social sciences toward stronger designs, just as it did in medicine decades ago.
The Use of HMs in School E ectiveness Studies
The last ten years have seen an increase in the attention paid to the quality with which public and commercial institutions carry out their mandates (e.g., Box, 1994) . In education this has taken the form of increased interest in measuring the e ectiveness of schools and teachers at promoting learning. One result in Great Britain, for example, has been a call for the publishing of \league tables," ranking schools in each area of the country by the achievements of their students on standardized tests at the end of each year. As mentioned by Goldstein (1992) and others, initially the British government proposed to do this without adjusting in any way for the achievement levels of the students upon entry to the schools, but more recently (e.g., TES, 1994) a greater willingness to measure the \value added" by each school, through a comparison of input and output achievement levels, has emerged. A number of authors have noted that HMs can play an important part in analyses of this type. My main points in this section are that the value added by HMs in school-e ectiveness studies would be increased by a stronger attempt to tell an explicit causal story about the outputs of the HM analyses that drive policy choices, and that cohort standardization and other biostatistical concepts already in use in hospital e ectiveness studies can help in this attempt.
The Guardian value-added survey (GE, 1993; Goldstein and Thomas, 1993 ) provides a good example within which to examine the connections between HMs and causal inference. In early 1993 Goldstein and Thomas (hereafter GT) requested the participation of almost all secondary-education institutions in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland in a major school e ectiveness study, but were able to achieve a school-level response rate of only about 15%. This produced a sample of 29,985 students in 425 institutions, from which data of two kinds were gathered: a baseline score X ij created by aggregating a set of standardized tests for student i in institution j, and a later achievement score Y ij for the same student, obtained in a similar manner from a di erent set of tests. The simplest HM that captures the avor of their analyses has the form Y ij = 0 + 1 X ij + j + e ij (level 1),
in which the u j and e ij are regarded as realizations of Gaussian random variables and the second level of the HM is like a regression with no school-level predictors. GT use this model to produce shrinkage estimates of the school e ects j , standard errors for these estimates, and a series of plots of intervals of the form^ j c c SE(^ j ), created to facilitate school rankings (with the multiplier c chosen so that \for all possible pairs of comparisons, the average signi cance level is 5%"). In this model the^ j take the form of a weighted average of the usual ANCOVA school-level residuals Y j ?(^ 0 +^ 1 X j )] and the grand mean of those residuals (zero), with weights (1 ?B j ) andB j , respectively, whereB j is the usual random-e ects shrinkage factor for school j.
Despite concerns about nonexchangeability of GT's schools with the rest of the policyrelevant population (which would, among other things, have implications for the quality of inferences about 1 , and therefore about the process of adjustment for baseline scores), it is unquestionable that this methodology represents a noticeable improvement over both the league tables rankings previously released by the British government (based only on the raw school means Y j , which on average were pulled about 75% of the way back toward the grand mean by model (4) in GT's analysis, meaning that the Y j provide a quite unstable set of predictions of what would be expected at the sampled schools next year) and results obtainable by treating the school e ects as xed. But what estimated causal e ects, if any, do the^ j actually correspond to?
This situation is exactly analogous to the health policy problem of trying to measure quality of care at the hospital level by comparing a hospital's observed mortality rate with what you would have expected given how sick its patients were when they arrived (e.g., Daley et al., 1988; Longford, 1991b; Thomas et al., 1992) , except that the outcome variable in the health policy problem is dichotomous rather than continuous. In the case of hospital mortality rates (e.g., Draper, 1994) it has proven useful to make a link between analyses like GT's and standardization methods motivated by counterfactual considerations, and the analogy is so strong that it seems worthwhile to do so in school e ectiveness studies as well.
From the point of view of experimental design, the process by which students wind up in particular schools in GT's data is observational, with achievement score Y as the quantitative outcome; school S (qualitative, at 425 levels) as the supposedly causal factor (SCF); and baseline score X as a quantitative PCF. To obtain a better estimate of the causal e ect of S on Y in the presence of confounding from X than that based on the raw school means Y j , you have to compare the factual data set (Y ; S; X) with your estimate of the counterfactual data set obtained by holding one of (S; X) constant and changing the other. Here this amounts to guessing at one or the other of the following counterfactuals:
Standardization to the national cohort (Hold S constant, change X): How would this school have done if its group of students had been di erent (e.g., average) at entry instead of whatever they were?
Standardization to the school cohort (Hold X constant, change S): How did the rest of the country do on average with students like those at this school? Because of nonlinearities in a given school's e ect on learning (e.g., on a common 100-point pre/post scale a particular school may take students scoring 20 on intake and bring them up on average to 30, but may only raise children starting at 60 to an average of 65), the answers to these two questions may not lead to the same school assessment conclusions.
Given the shrinkage character of the^ j , it is not at all clear which, if either, of these two counterfactual stories model (4) in e ect estimates. Sorting this out would be a net gain, because the various players involved in the school assessment drama have di erent utility functions corresponding to di erent counterfactuals. The British government, for example, presumably wants to know which are the best and worst schools, to use the former as case studies and to gure out how to improve the latter; for this purpose an analysis that standardizes to the national cohort would probably be easiest, since it directly holds the PCF of di erential student ability at intake constant in the ranking it produces. Many individual schools, on the other hand, do not expect their intake cohorts to di er much from year to year; for each of them standardization to their own cohort is probably of most direct relevance. A particular family, to take a third example, will want to know what di erences they might expect to see if they were to send their child to each of the quite small number of schools that are feasible for them on geographical and/or cost grounds. For this purpose standardization to their child (and others exchangeable with him/her) would be the ideal.
In closing this section it is probably worth emphasizing the limitations of HM (or any other) analyses of data like those collected by GT, in order that school e ectiveness studies not be oversold.
The observational nature of the data and the small yearly school-level sample sizes will sharply limit subanalyses|e.g., of the kind just mentioned as ideal for parentlevel decision-making|to broad exchangeability classes. GT, for example, produced separate results for each of the three groups (low, middle, high) de ned by the rst and third quartiles of the X distribution, and this may be about as ne as you can cut it. Even after careful modeling, school-level rankings based on models such as (4) carry large uncertainty bands, about which lists of point estimates like the original raw British government league tables are negligently silent. When distributions across the categories (de nitely better than, de nitely worse than, uncertain) are computed for the schools in GT's sample|by making pairwise comparisons between each school and all the other schools|and these distributions are averaged, the results are approximately (15%, 15%, 70%), meaning that the bands are too wide to locate most schools more accurately than somewhere in the middle of a large gray area. As noted by Goldstein (1991) , value-added rankings at their best should probably be used only diagnostically, as warning ags indicating where to focus attention in seeking causal explanations, which is like the best uses of hospital mortality rates so far.
\Multilevel modeling is not a panacea. Its power is limited, and it is most certainly not a magic wand that will allow us automatically to make de nitive pronouncements about di erences between individual schools."
Hierarchical Models and Meta-Analysis
HMs and meta-analysis (e.g., Glass, McGaw, & Smith, 1981) arrived on the social science scene at about the same time, and no wonder: the former is such a natural technical tool for implementing the latter that meta-analysis may be said to have been waiting for HMs to come along. Quantitative research synthesis is now an integral part of disciplines as varied as education and medicine, with the use of hierarchical models to capture betweenstudy variability commonplace. In this section I examine an interpretive point, arising in the use of HMs for this purpose, which has normative implications for allocation of research e ort and resources. A separate technical point will come up in the section below on tting HMs.
Consider the meta-analysis presented by Goodman (1989) and re-examined by Draper et al. (1993b) on data from six controlled clinical trials of the e ect of aspirin on mortality for patients who had survived a heart attack. Table 3 gives the data from the six studies; it may be seen that the rst ve trials were in good agreement with each other and with the view that aspirin causes a decline in mortality of about 2.3 percentage points (a 20% drop from 11.5%, the composite placebo mortality for the rst ve trials), but it is also clear that the sixth and largest trial|the Aspirin Myocardial Infarction Study (AMIS)|was in sharp disagreement with the other experiments. Three natural questions arise: (1) Why did AMIS get such di erent results? (2) If the answer to (1) is uncertain, what should be done next to reduce this uncertainty? (3) What therapy should be recommended to heart attack patients while we are waiting for the answer provided by (2)?
To move toward answers to these questions Goodman used standard empirical Bayes methods to t a Gaussian random-e ects two-level model,
in which y i is the mortality di erence in study i and the V i (the squared SEs in Table 3 ) are assumed known. Level 1 of this model is not hard to justify, at least approximately, on large-sample causal inference grounds; level 2 embodies a prior judgment of exchangeability of the e ects of aspirin on mortality across the patient cohorts and treatment protocols in the six studies. The maximum likelihood estimate of comes out about 1.5% here, leading to noticeably wider 95% central interval estimates for the \true e ect" than those obtained from the usual xed-e ects model that assumes = 0 (({3.2,+0.2) versus ({2.1,+0.2)). Adding level 2 to the hierarchy has de nitely improved the t y , but because there are no studylevel predictors in Goodman's model there has been no increase in causal understanding in moving from a xed-e ects to a random-e ects formulation, which means that model (5) is at best only part of the story.
Epidemiologists (e.g., Greenland, 1993) have begun to note that, although the use of (5) is certainly better than pretending that is 0 in the presence of substantial between-study heterogeneity, random-e ects models that simply describe the heterogeneity rather than attempting to explain it can actually promote an anti-scienti c attitude of indi erence to the cause of the study-level discrepancies. Indeed a caricature of (acceptable statistics, unacceptable science) involves ftossing the heterogeneity into the level-2 error term, verifying that the unexplained bit does look iid according to some standard distribution, and going on to the next problem feeling like the job was well doneg, rather than (say) carefully reading the articles documenting the studies|and perhaps also interviewing the principal investigators|to identify how the protocols and patients were di erent (Greenland claims that useful information of this type is almost always fairly straightforward to obtain) and to then include these di erences as level-2 predictors. Model (5) provides a better answer to the short-run third question posed above than that o ered by the xed-e ects formulation, but it is silent on the long-run (and ultimately more important) questions (1) and (2). A full answer to all three questions involves the use of model (5) as a kind of place-holder on the way to full causal understanding, while the answers to questions (1) and (2) are sought. Note that this perspective implies a di erent use of research time and money than that employed to answer question (3) alone.
For a social-science example of a much more satisfying meta-analysis|in which (a) model (5) is t to 19 experiments estimating teacher expectancy e ects on students' observed IQ scores and substantial between-study heterogeneity is noted, and (b) almost all of that heterogeneity is shown to disappear when the number of weeks of student-teacher iny Actually model (5) is not fully satisfactory either: AMIS is so discrepant that it is necessary to give up either normality or unconditional exchangeability in attempting an analysis like that based on this model. teraction prior to the experiment is accounted for|see Bryk & Raudenbush (1992, 
Fitting HMs in Education: Why So Little Comparative Study and MCMC?
Turning now to the tting of HMs, a Babel of options has arisen in the last seven or eight years, creating an embarrassment of apparent riches for the potential user and raising questions of choice, many of them still lacking fully satisfying answers. The main options are all one form or another of full or restricted maximum likelihood (FML, RML), including the EM algorithm, as implemented in Bryk et al.'s (1988) program HLM and in Wong & Mason's (1989) RML program GENMOD; iterative generalized least squares (IGLS), as carried out by Goldstein's (1987) RML programs ML2 and ML3; and Fisher scoring, as implemented in Longford's (1987) FML program VARCL. These programs can easily produce somewhat di erent answers on the same data set.
There are two curiosities in how the subject of tting HMs has evolved so far: Although an excellent study of GENMOD, HLM, ML2, and VARCL|documenting their design philosophies, implementation details, underlying models, software routines, data formats, user friendliness, and idiosyncrasies, and comparing their results on several data sets|has been available for the last few years (Kreft, de Leeuw, & Kim, 1990) , the de nitive investigation, probably involving extensive simulation, in which the four approaches and implementations are compared to known truth has yet to see the light of day. A recent simulation study by Rodr guez & Goldman (1993) of the use of ML3 and VARCL to t random-e ects logistic regression models (which contains some disquieting ndings z ) is a good beginning, but considerable comparative territory of great relevance to applied practice remains unexplored; and During the same period in which general-purpose implementations of FML and RML have arrived and have begun to receive widespread use in practice, a leading alternative to these methods|a fully Bayesian treatment of hierarchical models, involving Gibbs sampling or other Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques|has been under intense development in the statistics community and yet has received little attention in many of the social sciences, particularly education. The rst of these curiosities should take care of itself over the next few years as investigators like Rodr guez & Goldman add more pieces to the comparative puzzle. The second curiosity is more interesting for what it reveals about the present state of the old Bayesian/frequentist dichotomy, as follows.
Using Seltzer, Wong, & Bryk (1993) and Seltzer (1993) as a starting point, consider the Gaussian two-level HM y j = X j j + e j (level 1),
where y j is the n j 1 vector of outcomes for (say) the students in (say) school j, X j is an n j P matrix of (known) student-level predictors at school j, W j is a P K matrix of (known) school-level predictors, the components of e j are iid N(0; 2 ), the u j are P -variate z Rodr guez & Goldman found \that the estimates of xed e ects and variance components produced by VARCL and ML3] are subject to very substantial downward bias when the random e ects are su ciently large to be interesting." Draper normal with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix T , and there is independence across j at both levels of the model.
Since the advent of least squares 200 years ago it has been standard in the regression framework of level 1 in model (6) to include what might be thought of as individual-level latent variables (the e j ), but the inclusion of the school-level latent variables u j in level 2 (to increase the realism of the modeling, by accounting for between-school heterogeneity of the regression relationship in level 1) creates problems for standard frequentist methods such as ML. The likelihood function in this fully Gaussian formulation can be written down in closed form (although this is not true for versions of model (6) with Bernoulli outcomes), but the MLEs must be searched for iteratively.
Each of the existing tting approaches tries to solve this problem in its own way, and each approach has its pluses and minuses.
The EM algorithm produces full or restricted ML estimates by regarding the tting of model (6) as a missing data problem, in which the j play the role of missing data. A big plus for EM is that it always converges, no matter what starting values it is given; a big minus is that it often reaches the MLEs su ciently slowly that users may become impatient and stop it before it has converged. In fact there is good evidence from Kreft, de Leeuw, & Kim (1990) that this has been happening with the package HLM. A natural improvement would be to switch over from EM to Newton-Raphson iterations after awhile; perhaps future releases of the EM packages will try this. IGLS and Fisher scoring are closely related methods that treat the estimation of the regression coe cients and the variance/covariance unknowns 2 and T as separate but related problems, alternating the estimation of each using current guesses for the other. These methods have the advantage of much quicker convergence than EM, and VARCL's implementation of Fisher scoring has as an additional plus the ability to base its iterations on the Gaussian su cient statistics rather than the raw data, so that it can accommodate quite large data sets. A minus for these approaches is that convergence to the global MLEs is not guaranteed unless the starting values are su ciently good. The principal drawback of all three of these methods, though, is generic to the reliance on the maximum of the likelihood function when this may be unwise. An example is provided by Rubin's (1981 Rubin's ( , 1989 ) meta-analysis of data gathered by Alderman & Powers (1979) , to assess the e ectiveness of high school coaching programs that attempt to raise the verbal SAT scores of enrolling students. The data arose from parallel randomized experiments at k = 8 high schools (labeled A{H) on a total of 559 students, with an average of about 30 treatment and 40 control students at each school. The estimated treatment e ects ranged across the eight schools from about {1 to about +28 points, with SEs for these estimates on the order of 9{16 points (to assess the practical signi cance of these di erences, SAT verbal scores in college-bound students might average about 600 with an SD of about 75 points).
In addition to a fully Bayesian analysis of these data based on model (5) above, Rubin also examined the usual empirical Bayes solution that produces inferences about the level-2 regression parameter(s) (in this case just an intercept term) by conditioning on the MLEs of the variance parameters. He summarized the empirical Bayes tting of model (5) in a splendid plot, reproduced below as Figure 1 , in which the dotted line is the marginal likelihood for and the eight solid lines track the usual shrinkage estimates W i y i +(1?W i )^ of the \true" treatment e ects i of programs A{H as a function of , where^ is the grand mean
W i (which here came out about 8 SAT verbal points) and W i = 1=(V i + 2 ). It is evident from this plot that there is some heterogeneity in the e ects of the coaching programs: viewing the marginal likelihood of as its posterior distribution with a noninformative prior, Rubin's fully Bayesian analysis implies a summary value of of about 7 SAT verbal points. However the MLE of is zero, which poorly summarizes the evidence for heterogeneity. Figure 1 Shrinkage estimates of coaching e ects in the Alderman & Powers (1979) study as a function of the parameter , which quanti es heterogeneity across the eight experiments (from Rubin, 1981) The problem is that the marginal likelihood functions for variance parameters in hierarchical models tted to data sets with small numbers of level-2 units may be highly skewed, as in Figure 1 . The main solution to this problem in general with model (6) is the one Rubin adopted with model (5): a fully Bayesian analysis that propagates the uncertainty in the variance parameters through to the uncertainty about the regression parameters. This approach rewrites model (6) and adds a layer to the hierarchy for the speci cation of prior information: (y j j j ; 2 ) N n j (X j j ; 2 I n j ) (level 1),
The goal is computation and marginalization of the posterior distribution p( ; ; T ; 2 jy), and|as with the three ML methods|no closed-form solution is possible. Four approaches to tting model (7) are available, at least in principle: methods based on Laplace approximations (e.g., Tierney & Kadane, 1986) , quadrature (e.g., Naylor & Smith, 1982) , Monte Carlo integration with importance sampling (e.g., Hammersley & Handscomb, 1964) , and simulation from the posterior distribution, for instance using Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques such as Gibbs sampling (e.g., Smith & Roberts, 1993) . Of these the most naturally tailored to the hierarchical structure of model (7) is Gibbs: the idea is to iteratively sample from the four conditional posterior distributions p( 2 jy; ; ; T ), p( jy; ; T ; 2 ), p(T jy; ; ; 2 ), and p( jy; T ; ; 2 ), all of which do have closed-form expressions with standard, relatively exible choices for the prior level in (7). The main disadvantages of Gibbs sampling are that it is highly computationally intensive and that it can be hard to gure out if it has converged, although decent diagnostics are nally beginning to emerge (e.g., Tanner, 1993) . Its main advantages are that you get more accurate uncertainty assessments for the xed-e ects regression parameters in model (7), and that it is easy to answer just about any relevant question using simple descriptive summaries of the simulated draws from p( ; ; T ; 2 jy).
I conjecture that ten years from now the industry standard in tting hierarchical models will be one or another of the fully Bayesian methods, probably some sort of MCMC, to avoid the problems that maximum likelihood runs into with highly skewed marginal likelihood functions for the variance parameters. (In advocating fully Bayesian solutions Rubin, 1989 , o ers the rather vague advice that \As problems become harder, it becomes more important to be more fully Bayesian," but it is the skewness of the likelihood function|and the sharp underpropagation of uncertainty about the regression parameters resulting from pretending that the posterior uncertainty about the variance parameters is zero|that are the real diagnostics for the need to be fully Bayesian here.) This will create an apparently new problem of its own|speci cation of the prior distribution at the top level of the hierarchy|and indeed it is possible that investigators have been avoiding Gibbs because of this. However this problem is not really new, since all of the existing methods are in e ect fully Bayesian with one implicit prior or another (quite possibly not a very sensible prior, at that), and in any case the way you deal with prior speci cation in practice is through (a) detailed subject-matter study followed by (b) sensitivity analysis, both of which are part of good analytic practice already. This statement is a bit facile in making the elicitation of informative prior distributions in complicated problems sound easier than it actually is, but considerable progress has already been made (e.g., Kadane et al., 1980) , and in any case increasing the average level of experience in the analytic community in this important activity will be a net gain.
Discussion
Multilevel models have unquestioned usefulness in the social sciences, particularly in education, for at least two good reasons: such models permit the direct framing of theories about the e ects of structural change at each of a variety of levels in the educational hierarchy, and HMs at last o er the promise of routine and accurate adjustments to the standard uncertainty assessments based on simple random sampling, when the data are gathered in a hierarchical fashion in the presence of large intracluster correlations. However, the use of these models represents a net increase in the complexity of statistical modeling in the social sciences, and whenever such an increase has occurred in the past (see, e.g., Gould, 1981, on factor analysis) it has opened up the possibility of interpretive confusion and overstatement of what may be validly concluded from a given body of evidence.
I have used this paper in part as an occasion to question the uncritical use of statistical models|not just HMs, and not just in education|with data from observational studies and samples whose exchangeability with the unsampled portion of the target population is uncertain. It is possible to interpret this as an overly harsh attack on both hierarchical methods and observational data, but that is not my intent. Perhaps it would be good in closing to clarify the scope of my criticism, and the role I believe each of these things| multilevel models, and the design and analysis of observational studies and UE sampling plans|may constructively play in social science research.
Stochastic Models for \Nonstochastic" Data? The main point I have tried to make about the modeling of observational data is that it would be a net gain for investigators to make a greater e ort to justify the tting of models involving random variables with such data. When the data-gathering process, either in experimental design or in sample surveys, involves the planned introduction of randomization, it is both natural and appropriate in the modeling of the resulting data|from either a frequentist or Bayesian viewpoint|to regard the observations as the realizations of random variables, and ideally to identify the parameters in such models as population values of scienti cally relevant quantities that may be estimated from the data. But what is the logical basis for the use of stochastic models with observational studies and UE samples?
For concreteness consider again the growth-curve analysis employing model (1) by Huttenlocher et al. (1991) , of data on mothers and children from 22 families in the Chicago area, self-selected by responding to newspaper ads. If you had gathered these data yourself, you would have every right to t a parabola to each child's vocabulary growth curve, to let ti stand for the lack-of-t of such a parabola for child i at time t, to notice that the quadratic slopes from least squares do not appear to be the same for each child, to attempt to relate these slopes linearly to some function of the amount the child's mother spoke to him/her, and to call the lack-of-t of this second equation U i . But what would give you the right to regard the ti and U i as realizations of IID random variables?
The usual frequentist answer involves thinking of the data as randomly sampled values from a population, either literally chosen at random from the collection of people of direct scienti c or policy relevance, which would both justify what I have called sampling inference and animate the parameter estimates in model (1) and their standard errors with clear scienti c meaning; or hypothetically chosen from the collection of all possible data values you could get if you were to repeat your data-gathering activity forever, which would justify calibration inference arising from Fisher's hypothetical sampling model as in Section 3.1 but would lend relevance only to the p value(s) at the heart of that inference. In the frequency interpretation of probability the rst of these options is not available with UE samples, leaving calibration as the only justi able mode of inference with such data for frequentists.
In the Bayesian paradigm you are always free to use probability to quantify your uncertainty about things you do not know for sure, so the Bayesian story looks more promising as a basis for the \random variables" part of the phrase \IID random variables" above; and the device of de Finetti's Theorem (e.g., Draper et al., 1993a ) allows you to pass from exchangeability assumptions to IID. But just because you judgmentally assert exchangeability of sampled and unsampled units or of treatment and control people (apart from treatment status) doesn't make your assertion any more correct, when the available data are gathered in a nonrepresentative fashion from the target population or the treatment and control people di er with respect to relevant PCFs. Being a Bayesian permits you more freedom in attempting to move out of the top left corner of Table 2 with observational data and UE samples, but doesn't provide a guarantee that any such movement is justi ed.
The overall point here is that conceptual issues about the meaning of inferential outputs come rst, and have often been bypassed in the rush to complex modeling in social science research. This has negative consequences of both a process and an outcome character: the rei cation of hypothetical population parameters (process), and the overstatement of scope of ndings (outcome). I am sure that the investigators mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 are keenly aware of the limitations of their data, and consequently of their results, but they Draper do not always communicate these limitations e ectively. If teaching and methodological research in statistics were su ciently good, readers of these papers would be able to gure out the limitations for themselves, but it is probably unwise to count on this.
Making Good Use of Observational Data. I am not against the retrospective analysis of data from UE samples and observational studies when that's all you've got. What I am against is (a) loose summaries of what has been learned from analyzing them, and (b) a prospective over-reliance on them when stronger designs are possible. When they are not possible (e.g., as noted by Goldstein (1994, personal communication) , a randomized trial at one level of an educational hierarchy can often be no more than an observational study at other levels of the hierarchy), the emphasis shifts to identifying, measuring, and adjusting for all relevant PCFs to better justify the assumption of strong ignorability.
The other good use for observational data is in generating causal theories, to be subjected later to veri cation or falsi cation with stronger research designs. Raudenbush (1993, personal communication) identi es the tradeo between representative sampling and concern for intensive measurement, and suggests that \Moving from nationally representative data with`thin' measurement to local data with thick' measurement and then back to nationally representative data with new insights about measurement is a sensible way for science to evolve."
Problems arise in this approach only when people forget to note that the results of exploratory analyses are tentative, and when nobody bothers to do the con rmatory followup studies.
Prediction is Key. When it is working best the scienti c method has a built-in feedback loop: (1) Formulate a theory, (2) Use it to generate testable predictions of observable quantities, together with uncertainty assessments for those predictions, and (3) See how close these predictions come to observable reality. If the t is bad, modify the theory; if it's good, think of a more stringent predictive test; either way go back to (2). With unfortunate encouragement from the majority of statistical practice and pedagogy over the last 50 years, the social sciences have lagged behind other disciplines (e.g., astronomy) in the application of this formula, and education is no exception. In the 25 or so substantive articles, book chapters, and books on HMs in education I studied while preparing this paper, prediction was mentioned rarely and almost always only in passing.
HMs provide a natural technical framework for generating predictive distributions that can help to validate or falsify educational theories: in longitudinal analyses, by guessing at the future and waiting for it to unfold; in internal validation of cross-sectional analyses, by setting aside data values and trying to predict them from the rest; in external validation of cross-sectional studies, by predicting what will happen in the next sampled classroom. There is a golden opportunity for HM software developers and users to tighten up the feedback loop, by shifting some of the emphasis from inference about unobservable parameters to prediction of observables on scales of direct educational relevance. What will become of this opportunity?
